CAESAR 11
ft/
5
No.
CONTINUED CONTROL
RESIGNATION OF MALENKOV
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE AS0
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This document contains information within the meaning of Publict Congress.
^WP SLCRErF-
CAESAR 11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION ANDGIVEN
KHRUSHCBEV'S RISE IN PROMINENCE SINCE STALIN'S DEATH. .. -
CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICYHE NEW COURSE. . . -
THE AGRICULTURAL
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE
PERSONAL RIVALRY AND STRUGGLE FOR
MALENKOV'S ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN
MANAGERIAL
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER MALENKOV . .
The Soviet Leadership Since
Post-Malenkov Trends in Soviet
Foreign
Economic Policy After Malenkov
DISCUSSION AND
TOP SEGUE*-
INTRODUCTION
A number of differing Interpretations have boon advanced
to explain the demotion of G. U. Malenkov in5 from his position as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.
At one end of tho spectrum of interpretation Is tho viow that Malenkov's demotion represented his defeattruggle for personal power, with little or no conflict over matters of domestic or foreign policy involved. At the other extreme Is the view that sharp conflict oxlstcd or developed over policy problems, that in some manner the conflict on these problems camerisis, and Malenkov's ouster represented the resolution of this crisis. hird interpretationscapegoat" theory, according to which continued failures in Soviet agriculture or consumer goods production required that someone be "sorvod up" as responsible for the failures.-
There are numerous variants of these basic hypotheses. Variants of the power struggle theory range from rivalry of the individuals to rivalry of cliques and groups; fromof rivalry for heritage of Stalin's mantle to theout of long-standing enmities rooted deep in the past. Of the policy conflict hypothesis, different versionsprimary significance to foreign policy issues--Germany, Communist China, over-all assessment of the contemporaryto domesticproblems and policies, light versus heavy industry, short-run military requirements versus longer-run strengthening of the economy; and so on.
Under the "scapegoat" theory, one version is that the regime failed in its "new course" program for the consumer; another is that continued failure radically to Improve required that someone be blamed.
Some analysts have attempted to avoid attributing undue significance to any one factor or several factors, and instead view the ouster of Malenkov as resulting from tho interaction of all of tho various factors. The problem, in this view, is to attempt to trace out the pattern and mutually reciprocal interactions of the various causal factors.
Each of the above viewsypothesisroblem. actor oro what extent did that factor actually operate in the Malenkov upset, and bowole did it play?
The following paper assembles and re-examines the principal evidence believed pertinent to the leadership problem in the USSR. The re-examination was directed at ascertaining the validity of various causal elements in Malenkov's upset. The paper is not, therefore, an historical "reconstruction" of Malenkov's ouster and of Khrushchev'sopic which in itself offers promising opportunities for further research.
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MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION AND "OFFICIAL" EXPLANATIONS GIVEN
The "resignation" of G. M. Malenkov as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministersong period witnessing the rise of N. S. Khrushchev to. pre-eminence among the Soviet leaders, and moreeriod manifesting signs of controversy among the top leaders of the Soviet Union.
Specifically, the month preceding Malenkov's demotion was marked by authoritative Party attacks againstf the Party line, allegedly favoring equal or higher rates of growth In light, industry as compared with heavy Industry. References were made to "rightist deviation" in thisStalinist" tone had developed in the politicalhere was the emphasis on heavy industry; the references to "rightumerous referencesoreign danger to the USSR and the Soviet bloc; and justification of the heavy Industry line on the grounds of increasing themight of the USSR. Also, late inlenary Session of the Central Committee was held, and it was announced that the Supreme Soviet was to conveneho date set for the Supreme Sovietonth earlier than usual, and this fact, conjoint with the other Indications noted, created an expectation that Important decisions would be announced.
The'Supreme Soviet session itself first witnessedrevisions of the USSR budget, as compared with34 budgets. Significant changesubstantial increase in overt defenseeveling-off of capital Investment,ubstantial retrenchment infor light industry.
In this setting, the world was electrifiedebruary by the presentation to the Supreme Sovietetter of "resignation" from Malenkov. This letter is of considerable Interest in itself, and the text Invites certain commentary.
a. Malenkov based his "request" on "theof strengthening the leadership" of the Council of Ministers and "the expediency of having /Inostanother comrade who has greater" Further, Malenkov admitted thatwas "negatively affected" by "insufficient experience in local work" and by the fact that he did not earlier "effect direct guidance ofbranches of the national economy."
The above remarks, while not exactly false, are not fully true. Malenkov, although he never possessed the formal title of Minister, did in fact direct "individual branches" of the national economy: during the war ho was responsible forproduction;3 until at6 he wasfor reconstruction in war-devastated areas;73 he held high-level responsibility for agriculture. Also,8 toe was the top Secretary, under Stalin that is, of the Central Committee.
It is interesting to recall that several sources have averred that Malenkov's political decline6 resulted from" charges by his political enemies of inefficiency and lack of foresight in Soviet aircraft, manufacture, planning and Also, Malenkov's leadership in reconstruction of war damage is believed to have involved him in serious conflicts with other top Soviet leaders56 and to have been one of the political issues connected with his decline
It is also interesting to compare Malenkov's experience in directing "branches" of the economy with Bulganin's who succeeded him as Premier. Although Bulganin had been aof Gosbank and was Minister of Defense7e has had no more experience at the USSR Council of Ministers level than Malenkov,
b. Malenkov in his next section proceeds to contradict his own preceding statement by admitting that "for several years previouslyechenio ryada let doe had the assignment "to control and guide the work of central agricultural organs and the work of local party and administrativein the sphere of agriculture." Malenkov admitted "guilt and responsibility for thestate of affairs which has arisen in."
This Is the only specific failing Malenkov discusses. It very probably refers to the7nd makes, very strong the possibility that he was involved in the "agrogorod" disputehe principal figure of which was N. S. Khrushchev. It will be recalled that at the2 Party Congress, Malenkov in his review of domestic policies remarked that "certain of our leading comrades" had advanced and supported this "incorrect" policy.
ror SECRET
It will also be recalled that tho original charges against Beriaeference to opposing reforms in agriculture.
states, regarding thereform, "it is opportune to say that itout on the initiative of and inthe proposals of the Central Committee ofit is now evident what an Importantreform has
This statement, at least technically. Is probably false. The agricultural tax reform was proposed and approved at the3 Supreme Soviet session; the Plenum of the Central Committee held in3 concerned Itself, so far as is known, with the Beria case. More important for our purpose heretatement made by Khrushchev at the3 Central Committee session on agriculture. Khrushchev said, concerning/the Supremo Soviet actions on obligatoryand tax reform, that "the USSR Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Party Contralonsidered /these measuros/
reported4 that the tax reform
had been very popular among the peasantry and that they tended to Identify this reform with Malenkov. This seems very likely, and would explain the contrived effort tothis measure from Malenkov.
finds It necessary twice to"on tho Initiative and under the guidanceCentral Committee" serious and largefor surmounting agriculturalbeing undertaken. Malenkov states thatis "based on the only correct foundation:
the further development by overy means of heavy in-dustry." Malenkov adds that only this courseeal "upsurge" in production of "allessential for popular consumption."
Interestingly, the above reference to heavy industry is the only reflection, in the whole official publicof Malenkov's demotion,resumed inner-Partyconcerning the respective rates of growth of light and heavy industry. As will appear later, there is no real reason not to believe that Malenkov personally espoused the so-called "consumer goods" program. Yet Khrushchev had tagged advocates of preferential development of light industry as
"righthus the Malenkov text appearsto avoid this issue, so as not to equate Malenkov, at this stage at any rate, with the "traitors" Bukharln and Rykov,*
Several speculative points can be made regarding this letter of resignation. The first concerns the emphasis on inexperience and lack of leadership. One can legitimately ask: were these "facts" not known when Malenkov was first made Chairman of the Council of Ministers? The implication is that Malenkov should never have received this post at all, with the suggestion that some unusual factors must have operatedlevate him to this post. This consideration provokesspeculation regarding the role of Beria in the period following Stalin's death.
A second point is that these same references may be taken to signify an element of resentment, and perhaps even revenge, on the part of the older members of the Presidium, several of whom are "oldgainst the younger "upstart" Malenkov. This wouldertain element of personal friction and animosity between Malenkov and the senior Soviet leader..
Z2 the
The actual circumstances of Malenkov's ouster are unknown. It seems almost certain, however, that the matter was decided at the Central Committee plenum held fromhroughanuary. For example,ebruary tbe US Embassy reported that members of the Hearst party, which arrived in the USSR onanauary, were told they would be received by Bulganin if they could stay until tbe conclusion of the Supreme Soviet meeting. Their numerous requests for an interview with Malenkov were apparently ignored by the Russians. Furthermore, the Embassy notedebruary that Malenkov's name had not been mentioned once by speakers at the Supreme Soviet, which beganebruary, whereas more than half of the speakers had referred to Khrushchev in one way or another. This appears to reflect an already accomplished shift in power relationships.
Finally.CZ
fact of Malenkov's demotion was quite well known in certain Soviet circles before the Supreme Soviet meeting took place.
Pierre Courtade, speakingominform broadcast to Franceay, gave an interesting discussion of Malenkov's demotion. The discussion presented bis "resignation"rime example of the workings of the "superior" Soviet Inter alia, Courtade stated that "the question had been discussed previously /To its announcement/ by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the deputies of the Soviet parliament had received exact information on the whole situation."
* The Hungarian comrades were not so thoughtful in their treatment of Nagy.
Courtn.de, the foreign editor of L'Humanlte, earlier ZD an account of Malenkov's
"economicnd, while denying that there had been any differences with Malenkov on foreign policy, added that Malenkov had been prepared to "sacrifice the Bast Germanthough "not in the same sense" as Beria.*
Ambassador Bohlen reportedersion of the Malenkov ouster circulated by Ralph Parker, correspondent of the London Daily Worker. According to this story, Malenkov walked out of the Central Committee discussion of economic problems, and only after this action was the decision made to replace him. Elaboration of this story was reported onarch. According to Parker, who allegedly received theoviet source, it had been Foreign Minister Holotov who attacked Malenkov at the Central Committee; was allegedly absent that day. Molotov charged that Malenkov as Prime Minister . rought confusion in the Soviet economy by overemphasis on consumer goods production. Thematters were apportionment of vital raw materials and of skilled technical workers. Molotov asserted that, in effect, Malenkov was disregarding or exceeding the instructions of the Central Committee. Furthermore, according to this story, Molotov said that Malenkov had encouraged government workers In various economic ministries to disregard the Party representatives. The Plenum then reportedly voted against Malenkov's policies, at which point Malenkov lost his temper and walked out.**
,entral Committee membereputy
editor of Pravda, took some pains'to Impress
J the Idea that developments such as the Malenkov affair were not the result of "mere clashes" of personalities or rivalries.f
* See below, pagen Beria's alleged views on Germany.
mbassador Bohlen, while interested in the idea that it was Malenkov's recalcitrance that forced the issue, nonetheless notedarker's version does not, except on the point of maladministration, coincide in any respect with the official overt Soviet line on the demotion.
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A5 Contral Commlttoo Resolution,"all of tho members of the Presidium" (Includingreportedto have contained
the following accusations:
Malenkov lacked decisiveness and experience to direct tho govornment. He hadumber of important foreign and domestic policy matters
had been politicallyhad been under the Influence of Boria,and had boon blind to the significanceproposal to halt efforts to socializeand to permit reunification of Germany as
a "bourgeois" buffer state. Malenkov permitted Beria's "adventuristic" schemes to take place: specifically tho "Leningrad Affair" and the "Takovlev Affair." He likewise permitted Beria's ruralto be carried out.
emphasis on light industrya retardation of the tempo of hoavy Thisrightist deviation."
attempted to seize completeof tho Party and government.
The only ameliorating statement washat when Boria's activities wore exposed, Malenkovrominent and decisive role in denouncing and removing him.
Another discussion of the background of Malenkov's do-motion took DlaceC
Khrushchev in this Interview was outspokonly critical of what
he termed "the previousnmistakably referring to Malenkov. This polemic was startling andhat one Soviet leader discussed another Soviet leaderoreign representative.
Khrushchev was quite critical of Malenkov's administration. He apparently accusod Malenkov of "bureaucraticnd also of placing reliance on the state apparatus, rather than upon the Party and Party channels.*
Khrushchev reportedly statedrong course had beenadopted in dealing with the problem of demand. Malenkov had created demands in the Soviet people without having created the capacity for satisfying them. It was now clear that the only proper method of raising the standard of living was through continued emphasis on the development of heavy industry.**
On foreignKhrushchev stated
that Malenkov had not boen sufficiently "strong." He did not know exactly what he wanted; he was uncertain, weak and Khrushchev assorted that tho flnuor tone of the Soviot attitude in foreign affairs, as compared with the "previoushould not be taken to roflect aggressivebut was designed to "sober" aggressive circles abroad, especially in the United States. Khrushchov reportedly added in this connection that the Soviet Onion was not afraid of US bases, since the US must be aware that the USSR could destroy these basos withlow."
Other lossor Soviet officials havo also on occasion "frankly" discussed Malenkov's alleged managerial and executive deficiencies with foreigners.
This accusation has not figured In any overt discussion of the Malenkov affair. Again, what the Russians did not say, Rakosi in Hungarythat Nagy attempted tothe Party and to elevate the role of the statewith respect to the Party.
This is an interesting reversal of Khrushchev's reply to MacDuffle's question regarding tho roturn to heavy Khrushchov said on that occasion that there was no suchince the Party had never removed emphasis from heavy industry in the first place. Khrushchov said that Soviet statements had been "misinterpreted" in tho West.
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KHRUSHCHEV'S RISE IN PROMINENCE SINCE STALIN'S DEATH
In theonths since Stalin's death, Khrushchev moved from fifth position in the listings of tho all-powerful Party Presidiumosition of top Influence in the USSR.
The stage for bis rapid rise was sot in Marchhen Malenkov resigned from the Party Secretariat, leaving Khrushchev as sonlor man on the body that oxerclses immediate supervision ovor the powerful Party apparatus and controls most personnel appointments. It was the vehicle for Stalin's ise to power ins.
Following the purge of Beria in Julyhrushchev moved up to number three position in the listing of the Party Presidium. Then, in September of thatlenary mooting of the Party Central Committee made him First Secretary of the Party and hoard his report detailing tho Important nowprogram.
During the latter monthshrushchev continued to receive considerable publicity in connection with theprogram, and in4 he made another highly-publicized report to tbe Central Committeo outlining the ro-sults and prospects of tbe agricultural program. By this time Khrushchev was receiving more personal publicity than any other top Soviet leader and had definitely outstripped Molotov to become number-two man in the hierarchy.
The extent of Khrushchev's rise was fully revealed In April4 when ho and Malenkov eachrincipal addre.ss to one of the houses of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchevbefore tho slightly more important Council of tho Union.
During the spring, Khrushchev's personal publicity far outstripped that of the other Soviet leaders andoint where it threatened to shatter tho facade of collective leadership. He was active in many aspects of domestic affairs and led the Soviet delegation to the Polish and Czechoslovakian party congrosses.
In June, however,appeared toslightly. Contrary toheoport on agricultureContral Committeeand was not publiclyits decisions.
Khrushchev's position again Improved markedlyowever. He led the well-publicized Soviet "government" delegation to China and signed the Important Slno-Soviet agreement concluded at that time. On his way back from China, Khrushchev made an extensive inspection trip through the Soviet Far East and followed thisrip through Tadzhlklstan and Uzbekistan. These journeys gavealuable opportunity to make contacts In many areas of the USSR and cast him in the role of principal Party spokesman for many local Party and government officials.
Khrushchev's personal publicity increased during this period in connection with these trips and his other activities as Party First Seoretary. He was included in lists of Lenin's co-workers and "leading central committee workers sent directly to war work" which pointedly excluded Malenkov, and his name appeared increasingly in the Soviet press.
During the late fall Khrushchev's public activity He acted as principal regime spokesman in annumber of fields and,ecember hepeechonference of construction workers whichthe increased emphasis officially accorded theof heavy industry later in the month. peechathering of Komsomol members, Khrushchev, contrary to previous practice, stressed his close personal relationship with Stalin, and onhrushchev's name was linked with Lenin's when heentral Committee' decree changing the date and character of the celebration of Lenin's memory.
A striking sign of Khrushchev's importance came out of the Central Committee meeting commencing onanuary. His report to the plenum on increasing livestock production heavily stressed the importance of heavy industry and equa-ted theof those "woe-begone theoreticians" who had underestimated its importance with that of Bukharin and Rykov, politburowho were first demoted and then shot8 for "rightist deviations." This speech, which occupied six pages of Pravdaebruary, the opening day of the Supreme Soviet session, set the tone for the modification of the "New Course" effected at that session and made Khrushchev the principal spokesman for that important shift. The awareness of the.-Supreme Soviet delegates as to Khrushchev's leading position was evidenced by the fact that over half of the speakers mentioned his name in their reports, while none of them cited Malenkov.
Since the5 changes, Khrushchev's predominant position within the Soviet leadership has been confirmed. He hasery aggressive course in implementation of his agricultural policies, and has participated in theconferences undertaken by the Soviet leadership. Of particular -interest hero was his explicit designation as head of tho Soviet governmental delegation to Belgrade.
indications of Khrushchev's personal power position immediately after Malenkov's demotion woro somewhatthe situation had clarified byt which time the US Chargd In Moscow reportod that he was "particularlyy the deference which members of the leadership, including Bulganln, showed to Khrushchev,when the conversation was on real substance,"
CHANGES IS SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY ISHE NEW COURSE
A large volume of evidenceC"
conclusivelyignificant chango in the USSR's economic policy occurred34 while Malenkov was Premier. In brief, these changes consistedeal though marginal increase in the proportion of economic resourcos devoted to raising agricultural production and expandingof industrial consumer goods,eveling off (possibly -an actual decrease) of military expenditures. At the same time, the regime planned toapid rate of hoavy Industrial growth.'
Inoviet internal and foreign propaganda belabored this now emphasis on welfare of the population vory heavily, shifting4 to emphasis on agricultural Malonkov's3 speech before the Supremogave the first comprehensive survey of the program undor which the output of agriculture and consumer goods was to bo rapidly expanded "In the next two or three years." Voluminous public decrees were issued in September and3 to implement the individual sections of the program. Other documents Issued by the regime, the published versions of the Soviet annual budgets3reveal the planned leveling or possible docrease of military expenditures, and the continuation of rapid industrial growth.
Four major types of evidence show that during tho last half3 and most4 the' Soviet Union seriouslyto implemont the changes in policy called for by Its propaganda.
The decroes issued in September and3 to Implement the agricultural and consumer goods programsa vast quantity of statistical details concerning planned output of Individual items and specific measures to be undertaken. Publication of this mass of information would have been unnecessary if the regime had not intended to carry out its promisee to the populationotter life and greater material incentives.
3oviet economic journalsnumerous scholarly articles attempting to provido theoretical Justification for the planned sharp rises in agricultural and consumer goods output, which would inevitably resultowering of the proportion (though not necessarily
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the absolute level) of economic resources devoted.to the defense industry sector of the economy. These articles, by such economists as Ostrovityanov, Vckua, and Mstislavskl, were definitely not Intended as propaganda to mislead the West or even the Soviet population, because of their highly technical, theoretical nature. They were apparently efforts to buttress with politico-economic theory actual policies already Introduced by the government.
(3) The impressions gained by OS Embassy personnelSoviet Union, and reports
L ^jalmost uniformly show that the government wasto implement the consumer goods and agricultural programs In many cases achievement was lagging behind planned goals, but serious efforts were being made.
While the changes of Soviet economic policy inere not of large magnitude in terms of economic aggregates, and while they caused only marginal changes in tho proportion of total resources dovotcd to defense, heavy industry, and consumption, the direction of change was very important. The change apparentlyesire by the then dominant faction of the regime to devote increased efforts toward
strategic power. 3he leadership seemed to feel that these goals were more important than continuing to increase the already high production of military end items and expand the size of its armed forces.
Malenkov's Identification with the Consumer Goods Program. The emergence in the Soviet press in4 of theoret-ical polemics concerning the "incorrect" view that lightshould, in contemporary conditions, enjoydevelopment relative to heavy industry, engendered wide speculationpolicy split" between top Soviet leaders. In this view, Malenkov was identified as theof the "light industry" program, and the "defeat" of this program was held to be an Indication that he had lost out. This argument was based on the fact that Malenkov originally set forth the program Inhat his own political fortunes appeared to coincide with tbe ups and downs of tho program in Soviet propaganda; that Ualenkov, theas more inclined to appreciate the importance of incentives, whereas Khrushchev had made open statements which tended to qualify the consumer goods approach, and which were later in more or less open contradiction with tbe earlier formulations. This point of view was given apparentby the "resignation" of Malenkov iny the revised Soviet propaganda line emphasizing the heavy industrial development, and by the changes in5 budget.
Other serious students of Soviet affairs have questioned this identification. They have argued that no reliable source has over made such an identification, that it had never been Implied by Soviet press material, and that all Soviet leaders, on appropriate occasions, made appropriate statements reaffirming support of: the cpnsumer goods program.: These-analysts argua further that there is no reason not to believe that the programa "collective" decision, and that it is therefore hazardous to assume that Malenkov advocated the program any more than any other leader. Finally, in- this view, thein the Soviet press in4 were directed against "misinterpretations" of the Party line by certain obscure and little known economists, and therefore should not be taken as indications of policy controversy.
Thereumber of peculiar circumstances inthe consumer goods program. It was propounded bythe Supreme Soviet in This in Itselfunprecedented action, in that the Supreme Soviet hadbeen the forum for announcement of anchange.
J
i*
It seems fairly clear that the consumer goods program was pot presented to the Central Committee as was theprogram. There is no indication whatever that the July Plenum of the Central Committee, which considered the Beria matter, discussed or passed resolutions on consumer goods production.
Even more interesting are indications that thePlenum, which considered agricultural problems, also did not concern itself with the over-all program. Khru-shchovfe speech at this Plenum only briefly noted the existence of this program. Later in his speech, Khrushchev noted, in connection with the incentive concessions granted to the peasantry at the August Supreme Soviet session, that the Government "and the Presidium of the Party Central Committee have considered it
Infter the Central Committee session, several implementing decrees were issued, over the joint signatures of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, setting forth and elaborating details ofeptember Central Committee resolution on agriculture, which was in the natureroad policy directive. Each of these implementing decrees, as is customary, cited the
* Some distinctions need to be drawn on this point. the Soviet consumer became evident in the Sovietearly as
and by3 it was evidentoncerted programof consumer goods production was under way. however, did not involve any basic changes in expanded production was to be achieved byefficiency andoncerted drive to reduce andand waste, and was to be carried out principallyand co-operative enterprises and associations. Theoutlined by Malenkovugust went far bcvond
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authority ofeptember Central Committee resolutioo. Yet there is no indication of the existenceimilar Central Committee decree on manufactured consumer goods. Several joint Government and Central Committee decrees of an implementing nature were issued in October on manufactured consumer goods and light and food industries, but Into the agricultural decrees, no citation or suggestionroad policy-authorization decree was evident. in none of the speeches given on the consumer goods program was there reference to or suggestionasic Central Committee decree on the subject.
These indications suggest that the over-all consumer goods program was* conceived and decided upon solely within the small top group of Party leaders, and that it was never presented to the broader Central Committee Plenum, even for ratification.
This point has been developed at some length, since the criticisms of Malenkov, as reported by some sources, include the charge that he placed reliance on the state apparatus rather than upon the Party and Party channels; one sc-urce went so far as to charge that Malenkov attempted to set the state apparatus in opposition to the Party apparatus. tbe other hand, has been said to have made theCommittee his base of support, by appealing to it and presenting his proposals to it. The history of theof the Hew Course, and in particular of tbe agricultural programs, tends to support this analysis.
It is quite true that the Soviet press has neveridentified Malenkov or anyone else as the originator or insplrer of this or that particular policy or economic program. The nearest thing to such an attribution may be found in Khrushchev's interview with Professor Bernal inublished by the Soviet press in December, and in Kbrushchev's5 speech to the Komsomol, in which he claimed responsibilityax law of the Stalin period. In the Bernal interview, Khrushchev merely failed to deny Bernal's suggestion that he, Khrushchev, wasresponsible for the New Lands program.
Both Mikoyan and Kosygin, in their speeches inade laudatory reference only to Malenkov in connection with the over-all consumer goods program. Equally, bothto Khrushchev, but only in connection with The alternatives were to cite "the Party andor the "wise collective" of leaders, and for this reason the attributions to Malenkov and Khrushchev are thought to have some significance.
The publicity In the Soviet press at the time ofouster carofully avoided any suggestion that Malenkov had favored or advocated the light industry argument. It has already been noted that his letter of resignation avoided the problem and concentrated on his alleged errors in agriculture and administration. Since the light industry point of view bad been proscribed during the previous month as "rightlose to if not actually synonymous with treason, it is clearerious effort was made to avoid identifying Malenkov with it.
Soviet and Communist sources have been less reticentprivate contacts, however. Theanuary CentralResolution on Malenkov explicitly stated that hethe preferential development of light industrybranded thatrightist deviation." is of particular importance, since the documentfor tho Information of high Soviet governmentofficials, many of whom woro undoubtedly ataware of the true facts. Khrushchov, in hisSubandrio, identified Malenkov with the "erroneous"London Daily Worker correspondent Ralph Parker reportedstatementommunist
Another indication of Malenkov's responsibility for the consumer goods approach is the fact that he alone of the really Important leaders described tho programlowing and enthusiastic manner. Other less important leaders who used similar language were Mikoyan, Porvukhin, Saburov and Kosygin. Theso loaders, in their speeches, spoke of theIn terms of great urgency and tremendous importance. None of the other top leaders, in their references to the program, exhibited this same "enthusiasm" for it. Khrushchev, in particular, concontratod on his own agricultural schemes as of principal and foremost importance.
The role of the manufactured consumer goods program in connection with Malenkov's emphasis on "material self-Interest" is Important. Soviet sources have discussed this at sufficient
agy"in Hungary was openlyright deviationist" at the very beginning of his downfall in March.
Length to permit the conclusion that the two programs were integrally related. This point is stated more explicitly by economistho, In his article in Problems ofinaid:
"Under socialism it is impossible to develop productionorresponding growth in the material well-being of the onstant growth In the material and cultural level of tbe life of the workers it would be impossible to ensure the reproduction of skilled manpower, and consequently, the mastery of advanced technology. In the absence of such growth, an increase in the creative initiative of the workers, and an increase in laborould be unthinkable."
and:
"Increasing the material self-interest of workers in the results of their labor is possible only under conditions of maximum development of Soviet trade. In the absence of development of Soviet trade, economic stimulus by means of differentiation in the payannot yield its proper effect."
n proportion as the titanic programplanned by the Party and Government forthe production of consumer goods isand as Soviet trade is developed and the resulting further rapid increase in the purchasing power of the ruble is effected, the material self-interest of socialist production workers in the results of their labor will increase still further,"
Itoteworthy fact that, In the polemical literature of4 and5 supporting preferentialof heavy industry, little or no reference is made to "material self-interest" as an important principle of Party policy.
While the evidence is thus sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Malenkov probably was principally responsible for the initiation of the consumer goods approach, it is still
* Vckua was" severely castigated in articles in Party Life and Pravda in5 for his theoretical "errors."
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clearly unreasonable to suppose that he was alone In its advocacy, or that he brought the program into existence over any strong and unanimous objections of his colleagues. As has been made only too clear by subsequent events,akov himself never had the political strength singlehandedly to push throughasic revision in the direction of the Soviet economy. Nor did Malenkov alone have the strength, after his decline in3 and4 (relative toto maintain the consumer goods program4
it theroforo seems evident that Malonkov was supported by atajority within the Presidium, although-there apparently wero doubts and reservations on the part of some of the members.
It thus may very well have been the caso that Malenkov's program (like Khrushchev's later) was adopted on somethingrial basis by the other leaders and that opinion swung against Malenkov's "platform" as it was overtaken andby the New Lands program and as difficulties andconflicts emerged over the course of time. This view is supported by Khrushchev's remark to Subandrlo to the effect that "we now know" that the only way to Increase supply ofgoods Is by continued forced heavy industrial development.
It Is generally agreed that the state of Sovietand different approaches to the solution of this problem were key issues Id the Malenkov ouster. One analysis notes that "only in the case of agriculture did Malenkov and bis cbiof contender, Khrushchev, openly adopt positions which were contradictory, and these were on Issues extending back to Stalin's lifetime."
It will be recalled that agriculture was the only specific economic problem area discussed in Malenkov'sof resignation. And, as noted above,-agriculture is the only area in which overtly contradictory indications appeared. It in an interesting fact, therefore, that agricultural problems have figured eithor not at all or only marginally in the several "private" discussions of the Malenkovby Communist or Soviet sources.
The prioclpal events of the period, as related toare listed here for
inauguration of the so-calledby the3 Suprome SovietMalenkov's major policy speech at thatconcessions in procurements, prices,wero granted to the peasantry,regarded livestock raising and fruit andgrowing;
speech of N. S. Khrushchevlenary Session of the Centraland the Party decrees and Government
revelation in January and Februarythe so-called "New Lands" programeriesconferences in Moscow, and therole of Khrushchev, who spoke at eachconferences;
Plenary Session of the Centralin February andt whicha major report, and ateversalfrom the3 policy Major emphasis shifted to grainand the New Lands program was formalized.
Plenary Session oftapparently did not speak, and atin procurements and pricing werethe production of grain, similar to3 to animal husbandry andand vegotable growing;
Central Committee decree of Augusttho goals of the New Lands program byamount;
Plenary Session of the Centraloft which emphasis wasto heavy industrial production, and at"corn and fodder'" program was formalized. spoke at this Central Committee Plenum. program againhift in substantial areas in the traditionalareas of tho USSR were to shift fromto corn, representedheap and easy waythe fodder base of tho livestockwas at this Central Committee session,the demotion of Malenkov was arranged.
Before discussing the apparent respective positions of Malenkov and Khrushchev on agriculture, it Is worthwhile first to dispose of several subsidiary indications of differences be tween the two leaders.
The first of these was the remark by Malenkov concerning tho "agrogorod" policy1 in .his spoech ath Party Congress in In this speech. Malenkov stated:
"First of all, it should be noted thatof our leading officials have indulgedrongonsumer's approach, toof collective farm development, particularly in connection with carrying out the amalgamation of small collective farms. They proposed forcing the pace of mass Integration of villages into large collective farm settlements, suggesting that all tho old collective farm buildings and collective farmers' homes bo pulled down and largo 'collective farm settlements,' 'collective farm towns' or 'agro-cities* be built on new sites, and viewed this as the most Importanthe Party took timely measures to overcome these mistaken tendencies in the sphere of collective farm
"It must be further noted that the practice of setting up auxiliary enterprises for making bricks, tile and other manufactured goods has becomeon many collective and statehis situation must be
These references unmistakably refer to Khrushchev, the sole top-level sponsor and spokesman for the "agrogorod" concept and also for the subsidiary detail of local construction by collective and state farms. It is interesting to note that in his3 speech, Khrushchev reverted to this idea of local construction, and again recommended It.
The above statements are of course clearer in retrospect than they were at the time. The allegation in the5 decree on llalenkov is worth recalling in this connection,hat Malenkov "permitted" Beria's "rural program" to be carried out. This cryptic and obscure statement, taken in connection with the above quotations and with theevolution of Soviet agricultural policy, strongly suggests that Malenkov and Beria collaborated in opposing Khrushchev*
The second subsidiary indication of Khrushchev-Malenkov differences on agriculture is the fact that not once in his speech of3 did Khrushchev make reference to Malenkov, who less than one month earlier had expounded the "new course" In domestic economic policy, Includingpolicy. Later, Khrushchev became increasinglywith agricultural policy, expounding the "New Lands" program in January and Curiously enough, Malenkov in turn made no reference to this latter program in his election speech in
One final point to dispose of before sotting forth the respective positions of Malonkov and Khrushchev is the matter of Khrushchev's assertion of predominance in agricultural policy in3 and subsequently. He was, as already noted, rapporteur at the3 Plenum of the Central Committee. In his speech ofowever, Khrushchev revealed that,following the September Plenum, numerous Party Bureaux of the Republics and Oblaste were required to submiton agriculture to the Central Committee,and they were called to
i>oc Project CAKSAR Chapter S, for discussion of the "Agrogorod" problem andp ,or discussion of the agricultural references in the Beria case.
Moscow to discuss their reports with "the Central Committee. According to Khrushchev, "we disclosed shortcomings and arrived at broad conclusions, but did not adopt decisions; we agreed tolenary session of the given Party committee to take, up the questions which had arisen. epresentative of the Central Committee attended the plenary sessions and pointed
Khrushchev was, after this, the rapporteur at the4 Plenum and the5 Plenum of the Central Committee. He spoke at each of the agricultural conferences held in January ands already noted. He spoke on other occasions also, principally on agriculture. In- in his interview with Bernal, Khrushchev did not denytatement that he, Khrushchev, was personally "largely responsible" for the "Hew Lands" program.
While Malenkov and Khrushchev agreed that drasticin agriculture were central to success of onecourse" in consumer goods production, certaindifferences are evident in theirto
The first and major difference is Malenkov's apparent greater realization of the Importance of incentives, as opposed to Khrushchev's more "orthodox" Bolshevik reliance on bureaucratic and organizational measures. Thisis based principally, although not completely, on analysis of the published speeches of the two leaders; the conclusion derives in part from the impressions of the two men carried away by diplomats and others who have observed the Soviet leaders.
Malenkov, as is known, publicly Inaugurated thegoods" course in3 speech. In hison agriculture in this speech, Malenkov almostconfined himself to discussion of the agricultural tax reform; decrease in obligatory procurements and Increases in state purchase prices; and the encouragement of personal garden plots and of personally owned livestock.
These discussioos must have been held with the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee apparatus, with the Secretariat, and/or with tho Party Presidium. Khrushchev alluded ooly to the "Centralmplying one or both of the first two bodies mentioned above. These groups would have been largely under Khrushchev's personal control.
25
JleDkov's view, "the Government and the Party ContrRl Committee" found it necessary "first ando raise
the economic Interest of collective farms and collective
farmers- in developing the lagging branches of agriculture ^underline added.)
Khrushchev, in hisonth later, noted thatthe "material self-interest" of the peasantry was of greatut added important qualifications:
"However, these measures must be properly evaluated. Their Importance and necessity at the present time is obvious, but they do not determine tbe main path for developing collective farming."
According to Khrushchev, "hundreds and thousands ofcollective farms" were successfully meeting thenorms at the old delivery prices androfit. Thus, "thiB means that thenot solely on the raising of procur^nt andon the level of economica given collective farmj" (underline
aKhrushchev- tho principal problem in agriculturo was, and is, the problem of managomentand managerial personnel.
"In order to convert /our/ potentialities intoach collective Tarm must be strengthened in the organizational and managerial aspect and, above all, intelligentust be put inposts on each collective farm."
Further:
"The State has provided everything necessary
to handle work well on every state farm, but farming
results differ completely, depending on the quality
And:
"One has only to place and utilize peoplethe apparatus in province, territory and republic centers must bond good officials must be transferred to strengthen the district the collective and state farms and machine tractor stations."
The second major difference betveen Malenkov and Khrushchev concerned the matter of grain production. This is integrally related to the third problem aroa, the- "New Lands" program, which is principally directed at increasing grain output.
Ath Party Congress, Malenkov said:
"The grain problem, formerly consideredacute and serious problem, has beendefinitoly and
In3 speech, Malenkov stated flatly:
"Our country is fully supplied with grain."
Khrushchev, in contrast,onth later:
"We are in general satisfying the country's need for grain crops, In the sense that our country Is well supplied with
"We must ensure further and more rapid growth in grainhis is necessary not only to satisfy the population's growing demand for bread but also for rapid advances in all branches of agriculture."
In his4 speech, Khrushchev repeated the sense of the above excerpts, but then proceeded to remark only four paragraphs later:
"It should be noted that the level of grain production so far has not met all the requirements of tho nationalt cannot be overlooked that until recently some of our personnel did notufficient struggle to increase grain The gross grain crop is inadequate."*
Interestingly, the incentive measures adopted in3 to increase potato and vegetable growing and livestockdecrease in obligatory procurements andin purchasenot recommended for grain production at that time, or for that matter either in the
In his interview with Bernal inhrushchev explicitly denied that he had In any way contradictedbut rather that he, Khrushchev, discussed over-all grain requirements, whereas Malenkov had talked only of bread grain requirements.
27
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3 or4 Plenums which Khrushchev seemed to dominate. They were however, adopted at thePlenum of the Central Committee, the only Centralsession concerned with agriculture whereat Khrushchev was not the rapporteur.
A final area of difference very probably existed with respect to the entire "New Lands" program. Malenkov viewed the agricultural problem chiefly, if not completely, as the problem of inducing the backward and inefficient collective and state farms to achieve the production levels of thecollectives. He apparently did not envisage any great program of expansion of cultivation into marginal or remote areas. Ath Partyime when Malenkov was still the top Politburo man responsible for agriculture, he said:
"Now that the prewar level of sown acreage has been reached and surpassed, the only correct course in increasing farm output is to increase yields comprehensively. Raising yields is the principal task in farming. In order to meet this task it is necessary to raise the quality of field work and reduce the length of time for it, to improve utilization of tractors and farm machinery,omplete the mechanization of the basic operations in farming, to ensure the quickest possibleof crop rotation and the sowing ofgrasses on collective and state farms, to improve seed selection, to make proper soiluniversal, to Increase use ofand enlarge the irrigated area. It Isto heighten the organizing role of theand tractor stations in the collective farms, raising the responsibility of thesefor fulfillment of the plan for yields and gross harvests and for development of animal husbandry."
Further, onfter Stalin's death and shortly before Beria's purge, an authoritative article in Pravda on the Communist Party had this to say of agriculture:
"The Soviet State constantly augments capital investments In agriculture. Much work has beon undertaken for the mechanization of agricultural production, for increasing the fertility of thend there are also other great measures
28
top secret
for advancing agricultural production, especially In the central, densely populated areas of" the country where capital investment may give the groatesT conomic results in the shortest possible period of time." nderline added.)
In3 speech, Malenkov recommended measures toward the above ends, although, as earlier noted, he did not dwell at any.length on this aspect of the agricultural problem,
Khrushchev's3 program was on the above linos, although it elaborated every pointonsiderable extent. Khrushchev did mention expansion of sowo areas, however, and the Central Committee resolutioneptemberrief statement on expansion of sown areas.
In January andowever, it became evident from the speechesumber of agricultural conferences in the Kremlin that expansion of sown acreage wasassive scale. This program was then presented by Khrushchev to the Central Committee at its plenary session in late February, and was approved.
The expansion target approved by the Central Committee wasillion hectares. This apparently was an Increase from the target revealed in earlier speeches.*
It was stated that the proposed increase of sown area was merely the beginning ofrogram. Khrushchev said that "during the next two years we must prepare to continue developing new and more difficult tracts In the In actual fact, the goals were again raised, toillion hectares,entral Committee decree in
The new lands program was Justified on tho grounds that an urgent and rapid increase in grain production was basicapid advance in all other branches of agriculture and in the entire consumer goods program. This note of urgency runs through all of Khrushchev's discussions of the problem, and
Ho specific totals are available. However, the comparison can be made by plans for the RSFSR. Onobanov, RSFSR Agriculture Minister, stated that4illion hectares of new lands were to be tilled. Onebruary, Lobanov stated that,4he RSFSR was toillion hectares. It was this latter figure that was incorporated in the Centralresolution.
was forcefully expressed In his interview with Bernal in Also, the new lands expansion was claimed to be the cheapest way of bringingapid increase..
Furthermore, despite Khrushchev's assertions in his speeches and in the Bernal interview that more intensive use of existing agricultural areas remained an essential point of agricultural policy, he also told Bernal thatmachinery produced45 would be sent chiefly to the new lands.
"Consequently, the number of caterpillarthis year and next on the old cultivated lands will not be increased; to these lands will be sent inter-row tractors, cultivators and otherto cultivate the soil, as well as spare parts for existing tractors."
An essential point both of Malenkov's recommendations and of Khrushchev's program was the dispatch to theespecially to the machine tractor stations, of skilled workers and mechanics from schools and from industry as well. The new lands program upped the requirements for suchas well as for agricultural specialists and farm managers, considerably. Thus personnel for the new lands have been drawn from the traditional agricultural areas as well as from Industry. While it is impossible accurately to estimate the impact of these withdrawals on both the traditional agricultural economy and on industry, it is almost certainly great.
Finally, in January andhe Centralformallyurther element of Khrushchev'sa significant expansion of corn growing, intended toodder base for livestock expansion. The expansion of corn cultivation is to take place largely, though not completely, at the expense of area sown to grain in the traditionalareas.
One interesting little thread runs through thethe now lands: ontinued protestation thatare "realistic" and reasonable. This remark wasin the first Central Committee decree onwhereas speeches during the politicalJanuary and5 made the point that thehad proved the realism and reasonableness ofdespite the doubts and trepidation of some of
In addition, there can be road into Khrushchev's two speeches in Januarythe Komsomol and to the Centralcertain triumph over the doubters who bad questioned the new lands program.
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY
One of the most debatable and obscure aspects of the Malenkov affair is the role that foreign policy problems and issues may have played in it, and the implications thatestimates of the international situation may have had for the level of defense expenditures of the Soviet government.
For the six weeks or so preceding Malenkov'sSoviet propaganda emphasized the need for heavydevelopment, justifying itarked increase in emphasis on building the might of tbe Soviet state, theof national defense, and heightened International tension.
One line of analysis arguesplit in the Presidium on foreign policy matters was tbe central and fundamental factor in Malenkov's ouster. In this view, the leadersin their evaluations of the degree of seriousness of the world situation; these differences led to correspondingly different estimates of the defense requirements of the USSR; and the defense requirements in turn affected the whole range of domestic issues, but most particularly the problem of the relative priority to be accorded heavy industry.
Another line of analysis argues that foreign policy issues, while important, were nonetheless secondary to more fundamental domestic issues and the issue of power.
A third line of argument denies that foreign policyhad much if any relation to the leadership problem. Analysts holding this viewpoint believe that Malenkov's ouster was the result oferious domestic issueure struggle for power. These analysts argue that even the "new course" in Soviet foreign policy has been consistently applied by both Malenkov and Khrushchev, reflecting similar appraisals of the world situation, and that they have pursued foreign policy aimsonsistency and decisiveness which would argue against significant differences in policy outlook.
On the other hand, Ambassador Bohlenumber of occasions commented on an apparent difference in outlook of Malenkov and Khrushchev on international affairs. Iniew, Malenkov was Inclined toore sober and calm view of the international situation than did Khrushchev. In addition, the Ambassador interpreted the disparate treatment of light and heavy industry by the Soviet press in December
ign of division Id the top Soviet leadership, andthat tho problem of the exact course of action to be followed Id tho event of ratification of the Paris accords nay well have broughtispute regarding the domestic economic policies. Bohlen suggested, after Malenkov's actual ouster,latent dispute" concerning economic policies was "triggorod off" by the problem of German rearmament.
One analysis, basedetailed textual analysis of the leaders'evelops tho thesis of controversy on defense policy during the year preceding Malenkov's ouster, with Malenkov and Bulganin emerging as principal spokesman for the two points of view. This controversy, according to this analysis, was generated by conflicting views on the Implications for International affairs of possession ofomb by both the United States and the USSR.
The Malenkov view, according to this analysis, was apparently that the threat of mutual destruction bad made war less likely and that defense spending might thereforo bo stabilized.
** FBISome Policy Issues In the Malenkov-KhruBhchev Struggle.
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The opposing view, propounded by Bulganin, Implied that even with modern weapons war was Inevitable, emphasized the dangerurprise onslaught, and Insisted on oootlnued strengthening of the armed forces.
According to this analysis, this policy controversy continued at least untilnd must have been an important element In tbe controversy concerning relative priorities of light and heavy industry,
Divergent Statements and Outlook of Soviet Leaders onand Foreign Policy': After the death of Stalin and the purge ofhe Soviet leadersractice of frequent appearances at diplomatic or semiofficial receptions and social occasions, and in the course of these contacts have given some indication of their temperaments and sometimes their policy views.
Malenkov in his public speeches and personal contacts gave the diplomatic colony the almost unanimous impressionealistic and calm approach to problems of foreign policy. Malenkov inaugurated the "peace" campaign immediately after Stalin's death with his remark that there were no outstanding international Issues which could not be settled by peaceful negotiation. On diplomatic occasions ho invariablyeaceful line, on one occasion correcting Khrushchev, who was making belligerent statements.'
All Soviet leaders have expressed this peaceful line in ono way or another, however. The sole instance in which Ualenkov strayedunited" position on foreign policy was in his "election" speech in4 in which he saidew world war would signify.the "destruction of worldhich in turn made it imperative, according to Malenkov, to settle problems by negotiation rather than by resort to arms. Malenkov was the only top Soviet leader ever to give voice to this phrase, '
Significantly,onth later returned to the standard formulation concerning thisn his speech at tho4 Supreme Soviet session he saidew world war would result in the destruction ofacit repudiation of his earlier remark.
In his speech at the Supreme Soviet inolotov explicitly repudiated Malenkov's formulation, assertingew war would not mean the end of "world civilization" but only of capitalism. Since then there has been sustained discussion of this thesis in Kommunist and other Soviet publications. In these articles, the idea of the destruction of civilization is rejected as "theoretically 'erroneous" and "politically harmful." Acceptance of this thesis, they argue,esult of falling victim to the "atomic blackmail" of
the "imperialists" and reflects "weak nerves" and political shortsightedness. Malenkov is not mentioned by name in these articles, but one of them left no doubt by its remark that "some comrades" had given expression to this idea in their oral and printedis of course the only -top-level man to have made this statementublic speech.*
Malenkov's formulation is "politicallyccording to Pravda and Kommuolst, in that it plays into the hands of the imperialists and destroys the "peace" movement throughout the world and thusatalistic attitude in the struggle against war.
Thus Malenkov's remark may very well have been one of the "mistakes" of which he was accused both In the5 decree and In Khrushchev's remarks to Subandrlo.
Khrushchov, from the time of Stalin's death until hetop man in the USSR, was outspoken in his hostility toward the West, demonstrated none of the subtlety shown by Malenkov, and repeated dialectical stereotypes with seeming conviction. MacDuffie, who has seen more of him than any other non-Oommunlst Westerner, commented that hehocking rigidity in his thinking about theapparent willingness to swallow the propaganda he himself has helped create."
Khrushchev's speeches4 were very-strongly. anti-US. Ono of theseactless address at the Malenkov reception and dinner for the visiting British Laborite delegation in Another was his address in Peiping last October in which he supported the Chinese Communist claim to Formosa as a "legal and indivisible part of China." Khrushchev avoided, however, promising supportilitary sense.
In some contrast to Malenkov, Khrushchev's speeches havet-he idea of two inflexible opposed camps. C
Khrushchev led tho attack on the treaties to rearm Germany and stated that ratification wouldarger defense program for the USSR. He showed little interest In diplomatic moves toWestern disunity.
It is rather important to note that several important Soviet officials have privately affirmed thisell after the issue was "settled" in the Party press. It seems likely that the Soviet leadership is indeed fully aware of the de-structivenosseapons.
7 XJr j
Bulganin, who in his public speeches has tended to harp on the necessity for increasing Soviet military power and foronetheless has made some startling statements in his personal contacts, statements which have gone far beyond those of other leaders.
Specifically, Bulganin has on several occasionspolicies and approach to international affairs. 4 reception, Bulganin
Military Attaches that Stalin's policy had spoiled relationstho USSR and Its neighbors.** pulganln,went on to say that,olleague of Stalin's, he had always disagreed with Stalin on the latter's policy. Bulganin then said that "we" aro returning to Lonin's policy of good neighbor andwith Iran and Turkey, and that he was hot speakingbut was expressing the view of the Soviet government.
expressions on these points are understandable in that he was Defense Minister. However, in his4 speech hehrase slightly at variance with otherregarding the international situation: hat there had been no changes in the International situation that would warrant relaxation of effort to strengthen Soviet This phrase reappeared in Finance Minister Zverov's budget speech int tho time when the defense budget was increased byercent, and in Bulganln's own speech to the Supreme Soviet after ha had been elected "Premier.
L
reported Bulganin as saying that Stalin had
spoiled relations with Turkey and Iran, and. that he, Bulganin, had always disagreed with btalin's hostilo policy toward Turkey and Iran.
37
TfTfffT -
Kaganovich, like Khrushchov, apparently entertains an orthodox and doctrinaire Stalinist view of the world. At the Foreign Ministry receptions he became drunker, he lapsed more and more into "old Bolshevik" jargon.
A better indication, however, is Kaganovich's speoch at Prague in Llkoear earlier, also at Prague, Kaganovich apparently departed from his prepared text, adding some sentences and phrases and deleting othersrepared text. Bis departures from the text appeared toarticularly strong abhorrence of the Germans, and ato Communist ideology and its goals of world revolution equalled only by Khrushchev among top Soviet leaders.
Khrushchev, Bulganin and Zhdanov; Sinceery curious change has taken place in Soviet propagandaWorld War II. This change, which became pronounced and unmistakable ineliberate effort to deTemphasize the role of tho State Defense Committee, to elevate the roles of Bulganin and Khrushchev, and to associate these two leaders with the deceased Communist leaders A. A. Zhdanov and A. S, Shcherbakov.
For example. New Times for4 stated:
"The Central Committoe of the Party and the Soviet Government appointed Stalin Chairman of the State Defense Committee and made him head of the armed forces of the country. N. A. Bulganin,
FBISay 55
A. A. Zhdanov, A. S. Shchcrbakov, N.hrushchev and other outstanding leaders were likewiseby the Party to the work of directing the war effort."
The State DefeDse Comaittee, under Stalin, had previously been accorded, in propaganda, full credit for victory In the war, and individuals, other than Stalin, were singled out for credit. Inor oxample, the Juridical Dictionary gavo this committee "exclusive credit for organization of the destruction of German fascism."
The new propaganda trend not only subtracted credit from tho State Defense Committee, but In at least oneelegated itecondary position.
Obviously, the composition of the State Defense Committee had something to do with Its treatment in propaganda. Tho fire original members were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Later, Voznesensky, Kaganovlch, Mikoyan and Bulganin were addod to it, and Voroshilov was removed. Clearly, the now propaganda treatment of tho wartime victory was Intended to subtract from Malenkov's stature (and perhaps from that of othersnd to enhance tho roles of Khrushchev and Bulganin. .
More Interesting, however, is tho effort to associate Khrushchev and Bulganin with Zhdanov apd Shcherbakov. Shchqrbakov, who diednd Zhdanov, who diedere tho alleged "victims'* of the so-called Doctors' Plot of While Zhdanov's name had never been deleted from the roster of heroes of Communist mythology. It was nevertheless true that his name was very rarely mentioned, and the frequency of references in the recent past, therefore, is undoubtedly The presumed rivalry between Zhdanov and Malonkov is believed to have been responsible for the near absence ofto Zhdanov It is, therefore, of interest that Khrushchev and Bulganin have seen fit to Identifywith the Zhdanov symbolism.
In addition, there has emerged in the Soviet press and-In' Soviet ideological journals articlos and referencesZhdanovist" orientation. Three emphases arc evident: eturn to "partinnost"purity and discipline in Party ranks; an emphasis on "proletarianand a* resurgence of international aspects of Communism; and an inveighing against "fear and panic" in the face of "new and complicated" situations. The theme of
"partlonost" is evident in recent literary discussions, but also has boon introduced into the diatribes against theof "lightho are castigated asand "right deviationlBts,"
Tho themes relating to Communist internationalism andagainst "foar and panic" arc an essential component of tho argument denouncing Malenkov's assertionew war would result in destruction of world civilization.
There is thus very little question that those recent
ideological tendencies are intimately related to the Malenkov oustor.
The military budgetolitical issue: Reference has already been made to ooe study which, on the basislose textual analysis of speeches, concludes that conflicting views on tho Implications of modern weapons in the field ofaffairs was an Important policy issue betwoen the Soviet leaders.
Tho analysis notes that four SovietSaburov, Porvukhln andto call for an increase or strengthening of Soviet armed forces In their election speeches It notes also that Malenkov's contentionhird world war "would near, the destruction of world civilization" seemed to imply that this prospect made war less likely. This suggestion was supported by quotations from Pospelov and Mlkoyan to the effect that Sovietachievements wereobering effect" on tho enemies of the USSR. Mlkoyan explicitly stated that "the danger of war has considerably lessened as we now have not only the atomic but also the hydrogen bomb."* Mlkoyan noted that tho Unitod States, now vulnerable to destruction, hadow policy line as esult of Soviet-possession of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
Bulganin, the analysis continues,ontrary line in his4 speech:
otes that the passage from which this quote is takeo was deleted from the version of Mlkoyan's speech published in the central press.
"We cannot assume that the imperialists are spending enormous material resources and vast sums of money on armaments merely to frighten us. Nor can we count on the humaneness of the imperialists who, as life has shown, are capable of using any weapons of mass destruction."
The analysis observes that both Khrushchev and Bulganin on several occasions called for strengthening of Soviet defenses. In theew note appeared in discussions f the possibility of war: in July, in Warsaw, Bulganin pointed out that the USSR is forced to develop atomic weapons "so as not to bo left without weapons in case of surprise. While this theme of the possibility of surprise attack was not developed at theumber of references were made to it in speeches of Voroshilov, Molotov, and Bulganin in4 and in February and
ulganin asserted:
"In the international situation so far no such changes have taken place as would give us grounds to lessen in any measure our attention to questions of strengthening our defense capability."
This thought was echoed by Finance Minister Zverev in his budget speech ins justification forpercent increase in military allocations. The contradiction in thought of this expression with the remark of Mikoyan above Is clearly evident.
The analysis concludes that5 stress on tbe danger of being caught "unawares" suggests thatiew of tho insecurity of the Soviet position even when both sides possess thermonuclear weapons had won out over those whothat the likelihood of war had thereby been diminished.
PERSONAL RIVALRY AND STRUGGLE FOR POWER
Itifficult matter to separate political or policy difference from conflict over personal power and position. The difficulties can be illustrated by the well-knownthat policy differences tend to become personal issues; whereas, conversely, personal rivalry very frequentlyitself in competing political "platforms." Available evidence on the Soviet leadership does not permit determina- -tlon ofuestion.
Nevertheless, while the exact role of personal rivalryactor leading to malenkov's resignation cannot beits presenceonsiderable degree would appear to be almost certain. It would seem particularly likely however, that Ualenkov, presumably well schooled In the art ofhimselfhanging party line, would have been able to alter his own policies to fit the demands of the other leaders, if the question had been one of policy alone.
There is considerable reason to think that antagonism and perhaps enmity existed in Malenkov's relations with Khrushchev. These relations go back at least to thes when both were members of the Party organization in Uoscow. During World War II, they were directly associated in the Military Council of the Stalingrad front, and both were secretaries of the Central Committee9 Khru-shchev.andidate member of the Politburo8ull memberhile Malenkov attained these positions1espectively, although In Stalingrad and in the Secretariat, he had had the senior post. There were no indications during this early period that Khrushchev and Malenkov were antagonistic toward one another.
Bints of friction began to appear, however, ath Party Congresst. that time, Malenkov, in his majorto the Congress, appeared to go out of his way to remind that "certain of our leading officials" had been wrong in their efforts to amalgamate small collective farms into collective farms, towns or "agrogorods." This seemingly gratuitous remark made moreear after the policy had been abandoned must certainly have been aimed at Khrushchev, the only toppublicly associated with the policy.
Following Stalin's death, rivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev may very well have been engendered over malenkov's requested "release" from his key position on the partyin favor of Khrushchev. Even more damaging, however.
was Khrushchev's forail promotion six months later,s First Secretary of theimportant symbol of prestigels malenkov.
During this same period Khrushchev delivered his first major post-Stalin speech, which fillod in the details of the agricultural program Malenkov bad outlined the month before, yet made no attribution to him.
After that time, Khrushchev mentioned Malenkov on only twohis talk with Bernal in4 and in his speech to the Komsomols in However, neither of these references reflected any desire to praise Malenkov and indeed may even bo regarded as patronizing, an interpretation favored by Ambassador Bohlen.
There were other moves which suggested political Jockoy-iog. Khrushchev personally attended the Leningrad party plenum in3 which. Andrianov, longalenkov protege, from his post as First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. ear later, theof former State Security Chief.V. S. Abakumov and five of his associates in4 also suggested rivalry botwoon Khrushchev and Malenkov. The reference to the falsification of the "Leningrad Case" in the announcement of the execution soems almost certainly to have pertained to tho widespread sbake-up of the Lealngrad9 when Abakumov was security chief. At that time, Malenkov was generally credited with masterminding thoin order to place bis own henchmen in important posts in the Leningrad organization.
In addition, Malenkov's unique resignation announcement with its admission of guilt aod lack of experience suggests tho collaborationevengeful Khrushchev. Thisis buttressed by the hoavy emphasis in the document on the role of the party, and the obvious admission that the Malonkov agricultural tax reform was the work of the Central Committee. It was during this same Central Committee Plenum in5 that Khrushchev denounced manifestations of right-wing deviation in connection with some of tho liberal domesti policies associated with Malenkov, thus clearing tho path for Malenkov to be accused eventually of doctrinal heresy.
Malenkov's youth In comparison to the "Old Bolsheviks" in the Presidium, his rapid political rise, his role in the purgo ofs, and his personal influence with Stalin
probably were other sources of aDtaKonism or resentment. Finally, enmity can also be detected in Khrushchev's outspok conversation with the Indonesian Ambassador in which he said that Malenkov had attempted to run the government through bureaucrats rather than through Party representatives.
MALENKOV'S ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN MANAGERIAL ABILITIES
One problem which must be discussed. Inasmuch as it has been raised by various Soviet versions of Malenkov's demotion is the question of Malenkov's alleged inexperience andIn directing the affairs of state of the USSR.
It was noted earlier thatalenkov reportedly came under fire for ineptitude and lack of foresight in his wartime direction of the Soviet aircraft industry. the program for dismantling of industry in occupied areas which was under Malenkov's direction, was badlyand many losses, both industrial and political, were incurredesult of this program.*
Alleged deficiencies in executive abilities figured large In Malenkov's letter of resignation. Theanuaryon Malenkov mentioned them; Khrushchev specifically cited this point In his interview with Subandrio; and officials of the Soviet Ministry of Electric Power Stations openly alleged such deficiencies!"^
J that the frequent reorganizations and anprogram" to reduce substantially the number ofin the state apparatus introduced chaos andSovietthe re-
sulting frictions, uncertainties and sagging moraleerious and growing resentment against Malenkov.
There is, unfortunately, very little that can be affirmed regarding this question. One observation, however, is that other leaders, particularly Khrushchev, are at least asas Malenkov for the RIF program and for the transfer of government bureaucratic personnel to agriculture1 and The New Lands program, in particular, has undoubtedlyar greater number of persons to be drawn from the government apparatus than any specific program of Malenkov, Despite the true facts of responsibility for the reductions and transfers, however, it cannot be denied that in the minds of the personnel affected, Malenkov could very well have been blamed for the situation.
In the one area In which sufficient evidence is avail- ble, the facts appear to support the allegations against Malenkov. On the subject of returning Dalstroi to the MVD
JSARor discussion of this problem.
45
Idhen the mvd began to regain sone of the economic organizations It lost after Stalin's death, the negotiations and controversies extondodumber of months. The matter seemed decided sevoral times, first in favor of one party and then in favor of the other, but after each decision the question vas reopened.
At the very least, tbe history of thiss evidence of confusion and lack of decisiveness In top government circles andtrong and effectivelay of rival interests. It is certainly plausible to assume that the handling of tho Dalstroi matter was characteristic of the handling of other problems in the government.
Tho Soviet Leadership Since Malenkov
The removal of Malenkov from the Soviet premiership plainlyealignment of power within the Soviet party presidium, but there has been as yet no Indication that the searchurable substitute for the monolithic personal leadership of Stalin terminated with that event. There is no doubt that Party Secretary Khrushchev has been the chief beneficiary of Malenkov's decline and that he Is now the single most powerful Soviet leader although he still does not appear toonopoly of power. While the narrowing of the circle, first with the elimination of Beria and then with the political emasculation of Malenkov, has weakened theof grouponscious effort is apparently still being made to preserve the principle of collective leadership.
There haveumber of personnel changes in the Soviet party and governmental hierarchy since Malenkov's resignation in February. Some of these have resulted in the replacement or demotion of officials closely connected with Malenkov in the past and the appointment of Khrushchev proteges. This is, oflassic Soviet device for building power and if the changes continue, Khrushchev's personal, position may gradually become unshakable. Some of the changes appear to have been dictated largelyearch for competent management, and the present picture might be distorted if they were to be interpreted uniformly in terms of factional alignments and power struggle. The changes so far effected do not In any case amountholesale shake-up, and it would seem that. If Khrushchev aspires to supreme personal power, he has either preferred or been forced to move with caution. Khrushchev's influence on personnel changes has been most apparent within those areas for which he has shown special concern, and in which his personalis most directly engaged. hake-up of the agricultural ministries, announcedrought the dismissal of A. I. Kozlov as USSR Minister of State Farms and theto his post of I. A. Benedlktov, till then Minister of Agriculture. Kozlovong record of association with Malenkov and had been personally criticized by Khrushchev on more than one occasion during the past year. However, Benedik-tov would probably have been equally liable to complete removal had the political factor been the only one at work. He has been reassigned to what isess important post, it is true, but the transfer, while it appears to reflectlack of confidence in him, does not have the earmarksolitical vendetta.
The appointment odebruary of four new Deputyof the USSR Council of Ministers has brought into leading positions in the governmental structure, over the beads of former superiors, men who are presumably in sympathy with Khrushchev's methods and policies. There is no evidence of personal links between Khrushchev and two of the four new deputy chairmen A. P. Zavenyagln.and M. V.ut there is fairly good reason to suppose that P. P. Lobanov and V. A. Kucherenko owe their appointments to Khrushchev. Lobanovrominent part, alongside Khrushchev, at the zonal agricultural program with which he is so closely identified. Kucherenko, who has been named chairman of the State Committee on Construction Affairs, served underin the Ukraine and was singled out,by the latter for praise at the construction conference held In Moscow in December Khrushchev haseen interest in construction affairs and is largely responsible for the great stress which has been given to ferro-concrete construction.
The recall of L. G. Melnikov from the Soviet embassy in Rumania to head the newly-created Ministry of Construction of the Coal Industry, announcedpril, can probably be traced to Khrushchev, who wasredecessor as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. Melnikov had been purged from the Ukraine by Beria in He was partially rehabilitated after Beria's purge by receiving the Rumanian ambassadorship. The personal factor may also have played an important part in the removal of G. P. Aleksandrov as Minister of Culture onarch, for there are Indicationslose link between Malenkov and Aleksandrov. However, Aleksandrov's successor at the Ministry of Culture, N. A. Mikhailov, was once commonly regardedalenkov protege* also.
Within the party there have been very few announced changes since February. P. K. Ponomarenko was released as Firstof the Kazakh partyay to succeed Mikhailov as Soviet Ambassador to Poland, but the significance of this change is not yet clear. Khrushchev's hand can, however, be clearly seen in the removal of D. N. Melnik, who wasby Khrushchev at the January party plenum, from the post of Secretary of the Primorye Krai party. It is also noteworthy
* Zavenyagin's andareers since Stalin's death suggest that tbey were unacceptable to Malenkov, which may explain their elevation by Khrushchev and Bulganin.
that M. N. Shatalin, who is thought to have had close ties with Malenkov, was apparently removed from his powerfulas secretary of the Central Committee and appointed First Secretary of this far-distant Primorye Krai. Shatalin had been concerned as Secretary with party personnel appointments aDd probably also with party supervision of the policeand his removal, from the Secretariat almost certainlyightening of Khrushchev's grip on the party.
The appointment of K. F. Lunev as Deputy Chairman of the ommittee of State Securityhough It pre-dates Malenkov's resignation, is possibly another sign thathas gradually increased his control of the vital instruments of power, in this case, the police apparatus. Lunev, whose present post was revealed by the Soviet press onanuary, was identifiedirst deputy minister of the MVD in3 when he sat on the special court which condemned Beria. He had previously served under Khrushchev as an official of the Moscow Oblast, and it has been thought that Khrushchev was largely responsible for his position in the post-Beria security apparatus.
It seems, also, that the army has not been overlooked. While it has yet to be shown that the military have begun toignificant political influence, It is, nonetheless, likely that their good-will is something especially to be sought and heldime when crucial decisions must be made and power is still in flux. It is possible, then,irect and personal part in the recent promotion to marshal's rankumber of prominent Soviet generals, at least two of whom, Grechko and Moskalenko, have served with him in the past.
Khrushchev's salient role in the Belgrade parleys, in which Premier Bulganin was thoroughly overshadowed, is the clearest public sign yet that he is the ranking member of the Presidium. However, he has not beenlatantly artificial publicity build-up. Although he usually has the place of honor among his presidium colleagues at public ceremonies. Premiericture was placed before his in some of the May Day portrait displays. Thisrifling sign, perhaps, but not aone among the protocol-careful Soviet leaders. His numerous speeches before party, agricultural and industrial promotional conferences have been duly but not fulsomely reported by the Soviet press.
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Allusions to collective leadership, among them Bulganin's assurance to the Hearst party that the "principle of collectiv leadership with us istill appear regularly in the press, and alphabetical listing of presidium members, the literal symbol of collectivity, has been continued. Perhaps the most interesting reference to collectivity to appear recently is found in an article by the Old Bolshevik, G. Petrovsky, published in Prayda onpril. etrovsky wrote, "taught us collectivity in our work, often reminding us that all members of the Politburo are equal, and the secretary is elected to fulfill the decisions of the Central Committee of the party." This standard has been publicly ignored only occasionally. Both A. I. Kirichenko, First Secretary of the Party In Khrushchev's old bailiwick, the Ukraine, and Marshal Konev, for example, paid special deference to Khrushchev in their speeches. Interestingly enough, however, Pravda's version of Konev's speech revised the passage in the" broadcast version in which an attempt seems to have been made to set Khrushchev apart from and above his colleagues. In addition, Soviet diplomatic officials haveumber of occasions affirmed that collectivity has not been destroyed by Malenkov's ouster.
Since Malenkov's demotion Khrushchev seems to havereer hand in guiding policy, although not to the point of independence from the other leaders, and to have become more firmly entrenched in the party apparatus. There is some reason to suppose, also, that he has managed to strengthen his ties within the police apparatus and the armed forces, and may be able to count on greater support from that direction than before. However, there are almost certainly many men left in important positions who are indebted to Maleokov, and there is no signull open season has been declared on them. The search for effective leadership of the current agricultural and industrial program is the most plausible explanation of some of the personnel changes which have taken place recently aDd probably has had some influence even in those cases where the political motive is most clear. While Khrushchev has become the spearhead of both domestic and foreign policy, he does not appear to have the power to make unilateral decisions either in respect to policy or to personnel appointments. His authority is probably shared with, and to some extent depends on, other members of the presidium, among whom Bulganin, Kaganovich and Mikoyan appear to bo the most influential.
j
Bulganln's role is difficult to define. He does not have Khrushchev's authority, but he isorce in Soviet policy-making and an important factor in thebalance of personal relationships which presumably exists within the Presidium. Heeputation forability and, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, presumablyirect and positive influence on the operations of the Soviet government.
The three Old Bolsheviks, Kaganovich, Mlkoyan and Molotov, are men of long experience in particular areas of Soviet policy. It seems probable that neither Kaganovich nor Hikoyan aspires to the formal trappings of power,of their racial origin. However, for this same reason, they may nowivotal force within thethe force which can tip the scales in either direction in important deliberations. Furthermore, it is to-their advantage to keep the collective leadership alive. Kaganovich appears to be closest to Khrushchev personally and policy-wise; be is the one whopeech in4 gave pre-eminence to Khrushchev over Maleokov. Kaganovich's behind-the-scenes influence is probably considerable,In questions relating to industrial development.
Molotov's prestige appears to have suffered from the partial rapprochement with Tito, and it is possible that confidence in his judgment on other questions of foreign relations has been impaired. It seems fairly certain, in any case, that Molotov does notaramount voice in setting the broad lines of Soviet foreign policy. Both the larger decisions and those affecting relations with Communist states appear to be, instead, subject to collective discussion and agreement within the Presidium. Against this background, Molotov's resignation from the Foreign Ministry, which has been rumored since the Belgrade conference, is not inconceivable, but would shed little light on the balance of power within the Presidium.
Mlkoyan, whose resignation as Minister of Trade was announced on the eve of Malenkov's demotion, accompanied Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade, presumably to conduct the trade negotiations. 'Since February he has been promoted from Deputy to First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and apparently continues to act as the overlord of Soviet domestic and foreign trade. Mlkoyan, who was probably aligned with Malenkov in favoring increasedof consumer goods, does not seem to have been seriously injured by repudiation of that policy. It has been suggested
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that his promotion, like that of Pervukhln and Saburov, who were appolntod First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers simultaneously,olitical reward forof Malenkov. However, this interpretation, which seems to prosupposo that the victory of one of two clearly-defined factions was the prelude to Malenkov's demotion, may oversimplify the pattern of current relationships within the Presidium and the manner in which power has shifted there. Some of the Presidium members may have favored the present line oarller and more emphatically than othors, but Malenkov's' defeat seems to bavo been the consequenceradual shift of opinion which coalesced around Khrushchev, rather thanudden showdown between unequal factions. If this Is the case, the promotion of Mikoyan, Pervukhln and Saburov may have been intended, not as paymentolitical debt noreace-offeringefeated faction, butign that the Presidium's ranks had not been sharply divided and also, perhaps,emonstration of tho oxtent of Malenkov's disgrace.
Malenkov's present status resists cloar-cut definition. It is uncertain whether his immediate and completefrom the top ranks of the regime was consideredor marely undesirable. It may have been ruled out on the grounds that it would haverecariousbalance or because It would have presented anpicture of division and instability, thus undermining Soviet prestigo at home and abroad. Malenkov Is stillember of the USSR's topmost ruling body and, as such, continues to take his place beside other Presidium members at public functions. He is, however, the only member of the Party Presidium who sits on the Council of Ministers without the rank of First Deputy Chairman. It is possible that there isonsiderable body of opinion which favors his point of view, but it seems more likely that his present influence is negligible. The process of isolating andhim.soems, however, to have'been haltod for tbe moment. While culmination of the process may be scheduledore opportune time, it is equally possible that Soviet leaders are as uncertain about his future as tho outsido world. His position probably will be clarified ath Party Congress, presently scheduled for
The Sovlot leadership has passed through its secondreadjustment since Stalin's death. Collective leadership appears to continue toact andiction, but its base has been narrowed,redominance of power has tended to pass more and more into the hands of four or five top leaders.
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Post-Halenkov tronds in Soviet forolgn policy:
Soviet leaders havo continued since Malenkov'sto show tho high degree of flexibility in tho conduct of foreign policy characteristic of the entire post-Stalin period, and have re-eipbasized the possibility ofinternational lssuos.
Three main themes, addressed alike to friends, enemies and neutrals, have formed the framework within which post-Malenkov foreign policy is being executed:
The strongth and unity of the Sino-Sovlet bloc.
The Soviet government's wl.llingness to negotiate on all international issues.
The advantages which accrue to "in-between" nations with neutral foreign policies.
The first theme, peculiar to the post-Malonkov period, was introduced by:
Molotov's declarationebruary that Communist Chinaosition of equality with the USSR at tho head of the Socialist camp.
Bulganln's speechebruary giving greater Soviet support to Poiping on the Formosa issue.
Attempts by top Soviet leaders to underscore the strength of the "Socialist camp" in comparison with the United States.
In Molotov's foreign policy speechebruary, he asserted five times that the "correlation of forces" between the two rival social systems "has definitely changed to the advantage of Socialism." Be claimed, for the first time, that the USSR had nuclear superiority. ebruary speech likewise emphasized the theme of invincible Sovlot power and noted that production of Soviet heavy Industry "at present Is almost three and one half times greater than in"
At the same time, Soviet leadersounterbalance to this militant tone by strossing "peaceful coexistence" in speeches and interviews.
The bellicose and chauvinistic tone of the early February Supreme Soviet speeches may, in addition, have beon intended to prepare the bloc for unpalatable decisions in domestic economic policy and to reassure them of the Communist world's ability to deal with any threats arising from the agreements to rearm West Germany.
It is apparent that by the time the Supremeebruary, the Soviet leaders had concluded that there was little chance of averting ratification of the Paris* accords and that the time had come toew line of action calculated to regain the initiative and to disruptof Western defense agreements.
Tho first Soviet move to regain the initiative was the reopening of the long deadlocked Austrian question. From the reference to Austria Inebruary speech to the signing three months later of the Austrian state treaty onay, Moscow moved rapidly, showing unprecedented flexibility and willingness to compromise. Meanwhile, the USSR beganinto effect some of its threatened harsh countermeasures against West German rearmament. Onarch, the USSRthat the eight Soviet bloc powers hadreaty.of friendship, collaboration and mutual aid and the organizationnified bloc military command. pril, the Soviet government requested the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to abrogate Soviet wartime treaties with the United Kingdom and France.
Moscow apparently chose the Austrian settlement as the most impressive gesture it could make at the least cost, for the purpose of convincing the outside world that it was sincerely desirous of workingettlement of theissues between itself and the West. The apparentfor the USSR's rapidity of action on Austria is that it continued to view the political defeat of Westrimary objective of Soviet foreign policy.
It is evident, however, that West German rearmament as such was not the sole target of this phase of Soviet Onay, the USSRarge part of the Anglo-French disarmament proposals, in an omnibus "peace" andproposal to the UN General Assembly which it madeeeting of the stalemated UN disarmament subcommittee. Onay, the top Soviet leaders made an unprecedented journey to Belgrade where Khrushchev called publicly for abetween the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist parties and apologized for Soviet actions which lead to8 break.
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une, the USSR Invited Adenauor to visit Moscow to discuss establishment of normal relations, including trade, betweon the two countries. This rapid-fire series of moves soomod to bo aimed at undermining Western European support for NATO by persuading the Western Europeans that the Soviet military threat has faded.
In contrast to Moscow's hasty diplomacy in Europe,policy in Asia has continued to be more cautious,emphasis on actions directed toward firmer support ofChina's foreign policy ^
_jKhrushchev too* great pains to stress the USSR'swith China in all fields. Bulganin, in his Supreme Soviet speech, likewisereater measure of support for Peiping. The USSR's primary objective, both in private exchanges and in propaganda on the Formosa Issue during this period, has been to establish itself in the eyes of the world as the championegotiated settlement and placo tho United States in the position of refusing to settleIssues and relax tension.
Moscow's most immediate diplomatic target in tho Far East has been Japan, and approaches for establishment of normal relations were made by the Malenkov government. During tho post-Malenkov period, tho USSR continued this slow courting of Japan, but moved steadily toward bilateral negotiations which began in Londonune.
Moscow's long-established policy of encouraging India Id its Independent foreign policy and in its aspirations toediatory role betweon the two power blocs was continued. Groater emphasis has been placod on India, with laudatory statements on Nehru's government (which contributederious local election defeat for the Indian Communistn invitation for Nehru to visit the USSR which he did in early June, and the acceptance by Bulganin of an invitation to visit Indiaator date.
The Communist blocarge-scale effort tocultural and technical exchanges with private groups and officials In the south Asian area, particularly India, Indonesia and Burma. Concurrent with this activity, it haseries of offers to contribute technical assistance to economic and scientific projects, and to increase trade with the area. This effective combination of propaganda, trade
promotion and offers of economic aid was first given Increased emphasis by the USSRnd is an attempt to persuade the underdeveloped sooth Asian countries of the advantages of neutrality In the cold war.
Moscow maintained its more passivo role in the Near East. It temporarily increased its propaganda attacks on Western-sponsorod defense arrangements to take advantage of newbetween Turkey and the Arab states over the Turkish-Iraqi pact and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There were ew signs that the USSR might be initiating more active trade promotion and economic aid efforts similar to those, in south Asia.
In summary, the major trends in Soviet foreign policytho post-Malonkov period included:
beginningew course of action,by the use of conciliatory deeds, andregain the advantage in Europe which wasthe Paris accords were drafted.
continuation of the long-term policy oftoward the Sino-Soviet bloc's neighborssoon after Stalin's death.
Economic Policy after Malenkov:
The continuous growth of heavy industry* at asace as possible, has been the chief peacetime aim of Soviet economic policy since the end of the Civil War At any particular time, policy is defined by the relativegiven to each of the factors responsible for Industrial growth- Policy changes and controversies over policynecessarily concern the distribution of emphasis among these factors and considerations of short-term versus long-term prospects are frequently Involved.
The change In economic policy3 was ossontially the raising to higher priority of two factors in industrial growth. First, greatly increased attention was thenceforth to be paid to worker attitudesactor In economic growth. The opportunities here were especially great because of the long neglect of mass incentives under Stalin. Second, it was recognized that the stagnation of agriculture had to bein order to raise incentives by providing more and better consumer goods, and oven merely torop in per capita consumptionesult of the population growth, particularly urban. These measures were not, however, intended to decrease the resources going to heavy industry, although they dida leveling off of defense expenditures. Rather, they were apparently to be implemented with resources madeby the general growth of the economy.
The measures taken34 to solve these problems have already been described. This section analyzes the policy innovations5 in order to determine the economic reasons behind them and whether, taken together, they add upecond change in basic policy or to athe light of two years'anunchanged policy.
The budget presented by the Bulganin governmentiffered from its predecessor In several respects. Defense allocations, which had actually fallenere increased byercent to equal the all-time high" Expenditures for investments fell slightly below4 target, in contrast to the substantial gains of previous ears. While other sectors of the economy received about the same treatment as inin particular retained the high priority rating establishedhange in the pattern of allocations was made, with heavy Industry apparently obtaining substantial increases while light industrylight reduction.
The budget announcement was accompanied by the launching in January of an ambitious and risky program to expand the acreage under corn eightfold Three monthsampaign was begun to0 urban workers,reliable and administratively skilled, to replace the chairmen of nearly one third of the collective farms.
Another series of measures was directed at the average citizen, both as consumer and producer. The general cut in retail prices was omitted, for the first timehe compulsory State Loan, which had been halved3 and kept at the same levelas raised again to take three to four weeks' pay from each worker, as it had under Stalin. Lastly, the formationew State Committee on Wageseneral revision of wage rates, and
C_ jthis re-examination wouldaising of production norms, which determine theorker must deliver toiven amount of pay.
The boost in military expenditures may haveevised estimate of the USSR's international position, but it is at least in part the result of another development: the coming to fruition of developmental programs initiated earlier for complex modern weapons. As the time arrives for delivery of these advanced and high-cost end items,he new planes in the airshows, the procurement portion of the military budget must increase in order to pay for them.
The investment question is complicated5 because the Soviet data indicate that, while investment expenditures are planned to increase only6 percent) "the volume of investment this year Is to increase two to three times faster than this.* ecorded volume this much greater than new expenditures can perhaps be achieved, chiefly through concentration on the completion of existing projects, but gains of this typo arene-time nature and cannot be maintained indefinitely. The restriction of expenditures
* Soviet data on expenditures represent new moneyhile data on volume represents the value of Investment which has been accepted as completed. One major difference between the two is capital equipment; the valueachine tool, for example, is included in expenditure statistics as soon as it is bought but in volume statistics only after it has been installedactory.
pendituros but will leave tho economy with fewer projects from which to derive production Increases in later years.
In the industrial sector, budget allocations to heavy Industry rose byillionpercent increase, while those to light Industry fellporcent decrease While it is believedarge part of the lncreaso In heavy industry was madohange in budgetary accounting practice to include In this item expenditures on another activity, probably atomic energy, it is true ven after allowance is made for this, the allocations to heavy industry show an absolute gain while those to light industry wore reduced.
This divergence, coupled with official assertions that hoavy industry must grow faster than light, is regarded by somo analysts as evidenceolicy change in5 which Increased the emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of light industry. This is interpreted ashange In economic policy which stresses the output of capital goods as the principal moans to growth to the negloct of mass incentives and which regards the relative effort devoted to the twos an Improper combination.
This view would be more valid if the Soviet leadership. In determining its new policyad planned for light industry to grow rapidly4 and to compound this growth, although perhaps more slowly,. In fact this was not tho plan laid down The investment goal for light industry originally Bet4 wasercent above3 rate and over twice2 rate, but the5 target was only slightlyercent) Thus tho phasing of the plan calledadically increased effort in the first yearoderate expansion of this achievement in the second.
As It turned out, 4 offort was only partially successful: investment in light industry increasedercent Instead of the plannedercent. The real problem faced in drawing up5 budget for light industry was therefore to decide whether to try to make up4 investment failure and then perhaps go on to the level of5 plan. It was decided not to make tho attempt.
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The apparent reason for this is that tho consumer goods program had,by the endome up against certain hard facts in agriculture, on which the consumer approach largely depended. Promising as the new agricultural program might still seen to its authors, it had produced no startlingin its first year's test. Total agricultural output rose by only three percent, livestock numbers grew onlyand tbetargets for food output were consequently missed by varying amounts. It was to this set of circumstances that the llinlstor of the Food Industry was referring when he said in February that his industry would produceimes more food products thann3 policy change,5 target5 times0 level. nvestment plan for light industry, as laid downas predicated in large part on much higherof foods and fibers; until these materialized in fact, the original investment rate was uncalled for and even,eavily committed oconomy, wasteful.
The same sot ofdisappointments of4 record Inresponsible for other Innovations The adoption of the corn expansion plan, for example,esponse to previous livestock failures. It is anwhich Is quite in characters Now Landsand in fact presumes that the success of that program will justify the expansion of fodder corn in the old lands. In tbe field of fiscal policy, agricultural failure clearly is. responsible for tho State Loan increase and tho skipping of the price cuts. The income and price benefits extended to the population34 had already createdpressures. Further concessions would be not only Irresponsible but, in tho end, illusory and solf-defoating. What was required instead was an adjustment in purchasing power to correspond to the availability of goods, and those two moves wero the easiest way to achieve it. On the other
in thc
allocation of completed production, both the private consumer and tho agricultural soctor retained the high priorities they had been assigned in the policy changes The retention of this priority throughout and beyond the period of public discussion of "heavy versus light industry"that, whatever the real issues in this controversy, consumptionajor concern of the leadership.
In one area, the pattern of innovations was notclear. Tho revisions3 staked much on theof worker enthusiasmeans to growth. To this endurchasing powor was increased through higher prices tolarpo cuts in retail prices, reduction in the State
Loan and agricultural tax, and other measures. For reasons already examined, it was impossible to augment these benefits While none of them werether measures were adopted which tended in the opposite direction. The appointment0 urban workers as collective farmseems likely to be unpopular in the villages, and it is probable that the overhaul of the wage structure and the raising of output norms will result in increased pressures on urban workers. It is difficult to say whether thesewere regarded as necessary precisely because further concessions were for the moment impossible or whether theyisillusionment over the general effectiveness of concessions to promote further growth (they had not, it could be argued, produced much Id the way of concrete Even if the latter explanation were correct, the policy change Involved was marginal in view of the continuation of priority efforts in agriculture and housing, the major in the campaign to raise incentives through improved living standards.
In sum, while it is too early to make final judgments, the innovations in economic policy Id the first half5 appear to represent adjustments in the New Course rather than an abandonment of the commitments which defined that policy. Present policy seems to give roughly the same importance as before to the various factors contributing to long-run .inr dustrial growth. But the readjustments required by two years' experience were themselves of sufficient import to require corresponding adjustments in public opinion.
There can be little question that Malenkov's address of3 and the spate of decrees on agriculture, light industry, and trade which followed it had aroused popular expectations of improved living standards to their highest pitch since the end of the war. Welfare promises have alwaystaple of Soviet propaganda, however, and when4 crop results were in, it became evident that the assurances made3 of "abundance within the next two or three years"ajor blunder. Adjustments in purchasing power were begun in the5 budget session, but even before this, the media of mass communication had begun to effect readjustments which would prepare the Soviet citizen for the
In at least one instance, the granting of special incentives for corn production, worker benefits were extended. however, the increased incentive was in kind rather than in cash, thus avoiding further fiscal difficulties.
bad news. Tho message took the formeries of articles and editorials stressing the primacy of heavy Industry over light and the needaster development of the former than the latter. This policy was justified by its effects on future consumption, but tho requirements of defenseostile world were repeatedly adducedeinforcing argument.
As on sc many previous occasions, the extirpationeresy was chosen as the vehicle for bringing home this ull-blown heresy was in fact at hand in the views, published and unpublished,roup of economists who, carried away by the decisionsad calleddecisive and fundamental change in Soviet economic policy. Speaking from an elaborately developed theoretical framework, they argued that the era of forced industrialization was over and that the time had arrived when consumption could become the immediate rather than the long-range goal of the Soviet economy. To this group, one era was over and another had2 was freely spoken of as the end of the period of forced industrialization.
These views, particularly as they were expressed in the thesis that light Industry should grow faster than heavy, were specifically condemned by Pravda onanuary, the day before tho Central Committee Plenum began. They wereproscribed at the Plenum sessions, and subsequent articles repeated the condemnation, and stressed heavy industry's favored position, untilarch. On this day K. Ostrovltyanov, official head of the economics profession, published inummation of the heretics' errors. At the same time, He closed the issue by the device of also attacking those who "rushed to the othor extreme" and "passed over in silence the decisions of the Party and Government on the expansion of production of consumer goods."* Thereafter, the theme of the primacy of heavy Industryradual diminuendo in the Soviet press; it continued to be stated, but lessand less frequently.
* Ostrovityanov was chief editor of the important textbook Political Economy, published inn which it was maintained that,hort period, light industry might grow as fast as heavy in order to remove disproportions accumulated in previous years.
discussion And conclusions
It is evident from the preceding topical discussions that no one of the separate factors discussed can definitelyontributory cause in Malenkov's downfall. It appears that, in greater or lesser degree, each factor may Justifiably be believed to have played some role. Conversely, no one factor appears weighty enough to be consideredominant causal element, in and of itself.
It seems probable that Malenkov was indeed demoted by the "collectiveather than merely falling victim tohrushchev alone. It is only too clear in retrospect that Malen kov never had the personal position or power to implement his own programs singlehandedly. In other words, the "new course"hole, and Malenkovan, must have enjoyed the supportajority of the Party Presidium In tho beginning. Also, it should be noted that the policies identified with both Malenkov and Khrushchev were implemented side by siderolonged period of time.
Khrushchev, on the other hand, despite his obvious strength likewise does not appear, even after Malenkov's demotion, to be so strong as to dominate affairs over combined opposition from the other leaders. Be apparently enjoys their effective support, at least for the time being. For example, in pursuing his ambitious and grandiose agricultural projects, Khrushchev has made numerous journeys of several days duration away from Moscow. This is not the behaviorerson who is faced by sharp and combined opposition from the other leaders, orerson whose presence is necessary to maintain his dominance. Thus it must be that Khrushchev has powerful and effective support in Moscow or. that political controversy there is no longerhite heat.
Accepting this basic proposition', that group or collegial leadership has been effective throughout the Malenkov period andeconstruction of the Malenkov period would be as follows:
Following the resolution of the Beria crisis inrisis which apparently had preoccupied the Sovietsince Stalin's death, Malenkov proposed and secured general acquiescencerogram involving alleviation ofon the populace, marked expansion of consumer goodsand reform in agriculture. Despite Malenkov'sof this program to the Supreme Soviet, itcollective" decision, probablyajority of thesupporting It.
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Probablyounterweight to Malenkov's prestige,and by virtue of his dynamism and drive and ofpecial field, Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Party Central Committee and allowed to assume responsibility for agricultural policy, in his role as First Secretary, Khrushchev was able to appoint an increasingof people believed to be his supporters to key posts, and to reassert the role of the Party, especially in
That this blunt and energetic man clearly was not
complete agreement with Malenkov on agriculture was manifest at least by Furthermore, heew and vast program, which was unfolded in January andnd which shortly began to overshadow all other domestic programs under way at that time. There is adequate reason to believe that Malenkov was opposed to this New Lands program, but clearly it was bought, at least in its first phases, by the majority of the loaders and the Central Committee. This persumablyolitical defeat for Malenkov and his faction at that time, yet Malenkov remained as Prime Ministerhole year thereafter.
Thus, It appears that4 the top leadership was following both programs concurrently. Politicalapparently became sharper, however, as Khrushchev forged more and more to the fore, supported at least by Kaganovich but presumably at least to some extent by the other leaders. Khrushchev's dynamism and energy soon appeared to dominate the other members of the leadership.
As time went on, furthermore, three parallel developments apparently took place: Khrushchev, in control of agriculture, drove through more and more ambitious targets. Secondly, the failures in agricultural production4 raised questions about the handling of inflationary pressures and the proper level of investment in light5 which almost certainly engendered policy discussions at the top. Thirdly, for one reason or,another, important elements of the Soviet leadership apparently decided that Soviet militarydemanded an increase in defense production.*
*Although the role of the military in the Soviet leadership problem has not been discussed in thisompanion paper, Chapter XII, addresses itself to this problem. The view taken in this chapter, without demonstration, is that the military leaders may have played an Important role in the Malenkov upset, but that this role was not decisive.
It seems quite probable that Malenkov supported consumer goods requirements and that this was the grounds for the statement in the Central Committee resolution that he was willing to sacrifice the tempo of heavy industrialin favor of light Industry.
It appears however to have been generally agreed among the Soviet leaders that the entire consumer-oriented program rested largely on significant advances in various sectors of agricultural production. From this, Khrushchev could well have argued that further large increases In investment in light industry would endanger other plans and, until agricultural output responded to his new programs, would be premature.
In addition to these conflicting demands on the Soviet economy, it is clear that there was ativergence within the Soviet leadership over the closely interrelated problems of foreign affairs and defense; the lines ofand their importance in the demotion of Malenkov and elevation of Khrushchev are difficult to define, andSoviet actions have made them more so. Clearly, the inclusion in5 defense budget of funds cut out34 signifies that defense requirements were one important factor in the whole complex of changes inurthermore, the entire political crisis took place in an. atmosphere colored by propaganda warnings to strengthen Soviet military might.
Malenkov possibly entertained the Ideatretch-out In Soviet, military procurementslow-down in theof production of new weapons (over andefined program involving the regularization of military manpower practices, extensive reorganization of the armed forces and intensive weeding out of the officer corps).
The other leaders apparently did not agree with any stretch-out in procurements. To the contrary, there are indications that inerious efforts were begun to strengthen Soviet defensive capabilities, at least in the field of air defense. These indications, conjoint with the increases in the overt defense budgetrgue that, in some manner, important military questions intruded into the conflict already existing between Malenkov and Khrushchev.
Tho flexible and realistic foreign policy ofhas been pursued with greater intensity and purpose than before Malenkov's downfall. It seems likely that such differences as may have existed regarding foreign affairs were really differences in Khrushchev's and Malenkov'sestimates of the international situation, particularly the Implications of West German rearmament, the integration of Western Europe and the threat of armed conflict in tho Far East. While not affecting the main lines of Sovlotsuch differing estimates clearly were important in the field of defense planning and probably were motivating factors in domestic economic planning. The only manifest difference among the Soviet leaders was on the question of the effects of nuclear warfare. This difference is of little value, however, in evaluating respective positions because there is good reason to think that all the Soviet leaders recognizeuclear war would bring serious destruction to both sides, even though the post-Malenkov line hasecision that it was and wouldundamental error to admit this.
Of the actual problems or circumstances that precipitated the political upset, almost nothing can be said. It Is quite possible that the actual crisis was precipitated by thetoward the endo prepare the annual planince at this time all of the conflicting requirements, priorities and programs would have to be hammered out. econd possibility is that Malonkov became convincodine must bo drawn as Khrushchov propounded his second major agricultural policyis, the "corn" program adopted by the Central Committee In Malenkov could well have resisted this new program as involving risks of evon greater magnitude than the Now Lands program. Thirdly, Khrushchev and his faction, harboring their basic resentments and misgivings of Malenkov, may have taken tbe offensive by attacking both his broad consumer-oriented incentives approach and his ideological outlook. Fourthly, the success of the Paris conference of4 in finding substitutefor EDC waserious setback to Soviet policy that it may have triggered the final moves against Malenkov, Those possibilities are not exclusive; all four could very well be true.
The various considerations above apparently becamewith tbe other top leaders, to the extentajority against Malenkov, spearheaded by Khrushchev, emerged in the Presidium and top Party circles. From this point on, whether Malenkov was jockoyed out of the Premiership or whether he was adamant in his espousal of his defeated program Is completely conjectural.
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Thus it appears that Malenkov's differences with the other Soviet leaders, whether resulting from temperamental or personality make-up or from his independent rational analysis of the situation, sweptroad range of issues which, at many points, touched on fundamental aspects of the Soviet order.
Original document.
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