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Abuses of civil liberties could create a backlash that would impair the
collection of needed intelligence.

· Creating a new domestic intelligence agency would divert attention

of the officials most responsible for current counterterrorism efforts
while the threat remains high. Putting a new player into the mix of
federal agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities would exacer-
bate existing information-sharing problems.

· A new domestic intelligence agency would need to acquire assets and

personnel.The FBI already has 28,000 employees; 56 field offices, 400
satellite offices, and 47 legal attaché offices; a laboratory, operations
center, and training facility; an existing network of informants, coop-
erating defendants, and other sources; and relationships with state and
local law enforcement, the CIA, and foreign intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.

· Counterterrorism investigations in the United States very quickly

become matters that involve violations of criminal law and possible
law enforcement action. Because the FBI can have agents working
criminal matters and agents working intelligence investigations con-
cerning the same international terrorism target, the full range of inves-
tigative tools against a suspected terrorist can be considered within
one agency. The removal of "the wall" that existed before 9/11
between intelligence and law enforcement has opened up new
opportunities for cooperative action within the FBI.

· Counterterrorism investigations often overlap or are cued by other

criminal investigations, such as money laundering or the smuggling
of contraband. In the field, the close connection to criminal work has
many benefits.

Our recommendation to leave counterterrorism intelligence collection in the
United States with the FBI still depends on an assessment that the FBI--if it
makes an all-out effort to institutionalize change--can do the job.As we men-
tioned in chapter 3, we have been impressed by the determination that agents
display in tracking down details, patiently going the extra mile and working
the extra month, to put facts in the place of speculation. In our report we have
shown how agents in Phoenix, Minneapolis, and New York displayed initiative
in pressing their investigations.

FBI agents and analysts in the field need to have sustained support and ded-

icated resources to become stronger intelligence officers. They need to be
rewarded for acquiring informants and for gathering and disseminating infor-
mation differently and more broadly than usual in a traditional criminal inves-

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