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· On terrorism, Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban.The Pakistani army

and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long
been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the
government have sympathized with or provided support to the
extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Ladin was bad. But before 9/11,
preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence.

· On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not

barter with its nuclear technology. But proliferation concerns have
been long-standing and very serious. Most recently, the Pakistani gov-
ernment has claimed not to have known that one of its nuclear
weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most danger-
ous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed.

· Finally, Pakistan has made little progress toward the return of demo-

cratic rule at the national level, although that turbulent process does
continue to function at the provincial level and the Pakistani press
remains relatively free.

Immediately after 9/11, confronted by the United States with a stark choice,
Pakistan made a strategic decision. Its government stood aside and allowed the
U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime. In other ways, Pakistan actively
assisted: its authorities arrested more than 500 al Qaeda operatives and Taliban
members, and Pakistani forces played a leading part in tracking down KSM,
Abu Zubaydah, and other key al Qaeda figures.

In the following two years, the Pakistani government tried to walk the fence,

helping against al Qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with Tal-
iban remnants and other Islamic extremists. When al Qaeda and its Pakistani
allies repeatedly tried to assassinate Musharraf, almost succeeding, the battle
came home.

The country's vast unpoliced regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists

seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coali-
tion forces in Afghanistan. Almost all the 9/11 attackers traveled the north-
south nexus of KandaharQuettaKarachi.The Baluchistan region of Pakistan
(KSM's ethnic home) and the sprawling city of Karachi remain centers of
Islamist extremism where the U.S. and Pakistani security and intelligence pres-
ence has been weak. The U.S. consulate in Karachi is a makeshift fortress,
reflecting the gravity of the surrounding threat.

During the winter of 20032004, Musharraf made another strategic deci-

sion. He ordered the Pakistani army into the frontier provinces of northwest
Pakistan along the Afghan border, where Bin Ladin and Ayman al Zawahiri have
reportedly taken refuge. The army is confronting groups of al Qaeda fighters
and their local allies in very difficult terrain. On the other side of the frontier,
U.S. forces in Afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint

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