ticular field location where the suspects were being tracked at any given time.
On the other hand, he also said that the Counterterrorist Center was supposed
to manage all the moving parts, while what happened on the ground was the
responsibility of managers in the field.
or headquarters would urge someone to do something. But headquarters never
really took responsibility for the successful management of this case. Hence the
managers at CIA headquarters did not realize that omissions in planning had
occurred, and they scarcely knew that the case had fallen apart.
was "considered interesting, but not heavy water yet." He recalled the failure
to get the word to Bangkok fast enough, but has no evident recollection of
why the case then dissolved, unnoticed.
with the Cole investigators at the June 11 meeting.
the United States and thus does not take adequate action to
share information, assign resources, and give sufficient priority
to the search.
beliefs and thus does not take adequate action to share infor-
mation, involve higher-level officials across agencies, obtain
information regarding Moussaoui's ties to al Qaeda, and give
sufficient priority to determining what Moussaoui might be
planning.
nect information identifying KSM as the "Mukhtar" mentioned
in other reports to the analysis that could have linked
"Mukhtar" with Ramzi Binalshibh and Moussaoui.
ing about imminent attacks.