The Challenge of Incident Command.
cies in the City of New York."The directive designated, for different types of
emergencies, an appropriate agency as "Incident Commander"; it would be
"responsible for the management of the City's response to the emergency." The
directive also provided that where incidents are "so multifaceted that no one
agency immediately stands out as the Incident Commander, OEM will assign
the role of Incident Commander to an agency as the situation demands."
other responding local, federal, bistate, and state agencies acted in a supporting
role. There was a tacit understanding that FDNY personnel would have pri-
mary responsibility for evacuating civilians who were above the ground floors
of the Twin Towers, while NYPD and PAPD personnel would be in charge of
evacuating civilians from the WTC complex once they reached ground level.
The NYPD also greatly assisted responding FDNY units by clearing emer-
gency lanes to the WTC.
Department of the FDNY at approximately 9:20.There were other instances
of coordination at operational levels, and information was shared on an ad hoc
basis. For example, an NYPD ESU team passed the news of their evacuation
order to firefighters in the North Tower.
directive. These problems existed both within and among individual
responding agencies.
mand and control of its own units and adequate internal communications.This
was not always the case at the WTC on 9/11.
incapable of coordinating the numbers of units dispatched to different points
within the 16-acre complex.As a result, numerous units were congregating in
the undamaged Marriott Hotel and at the overall command post on West Street
by 9:30, while chiefs in charge of the South Tower still were in desperate need
of units.With better understanding of the resources already available, additional
units might not have been dispatched to the South Tower at 9:37.