of terrorism, many officials continued to think of terrorists as agents of states
(Saudi Hezbollah acting for Iran against Khobar Towers) or as domestic crim-
inals (Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City). As we pointed out in chapter 3,
the White House is not a natural locus for program management. Hence, gov-
ernment efforts to cope with terrorism were essentially the work of individ-
ual agencies.
security problem, not just a law enforcement issue.They reinforced the author-
ity of the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate domestic as well as
foreign counterterrorism efforts, through Richard Clarke and his interagency
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG). Spotlighting new concerns about
unconventional attacks, these directives assigned tasks to lead agencies but did
not differentiate types of terrorist threats.Thus, while Clarke might prod or push
agencies to act, what actually happened was usually decided at the State Depart-
ment, the Pentagon, the CIA, or the Justice Department.The efforts of these
agencies were sometimes energetic and sometimes effective.Terrorist plots were
disrupted and individual terrorists were captured. But the United States did not,
before 9/11, adopt as a clear strategic objective the elimination of al Qaeda.
Until 1996, hardly anyone in the U.S. government understood that Usama Bin
Ladin was an inspirer and organizer of the new terrorism. In 1993, the CIA
noted that he had paid for the training of some Egyptian terrorists in Sudan.
The State Department detected his money in aid to the Yemeni terrorists who